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CATCHIN' THE HEAT OF THE BEAT: FIRST
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF MUSIC CLAIMED
TO INCITE VIOLENT BEHAVIOR
Robert Firester and Kendall T Jones *
Cops on my tail, so I bail till I dodge them,
They finally pull me over and I laugh,
Remember Rodney King
And I blast his punk ass
Now I got a murder case...
... What the if--k] would you do?
Drop them or let them drop you?
I choose droppin' the cop!'
I. INTRODUCTION
Songs containing strong anti-police messages, replete with
accompanying gunshot and siren noises, blasted through the head of Ronald
Ray Howard on the evening of April 11, 1992 as he drove a stolen Chevrolet
Blazer through Texas.2 When Texas State Trooper Bill Davidson pulled
Howard over to issue him a ticket for a missing headlight, Howard claimed he
*Robert Firester is an Associate Professor of Law at John Marshall Law School, Atlanta,
Georgia; J.D., Hofstra University School of Law, 1990, B.S., M.I.T., 1981. Kendall Jones is a
practicing attorney in Atlanta, Georgia; J.D., Vanderbilt School of Law, 1995; B.A., University of
Virginia, 1989. We thank David B. Meltz, Dean Emeritus at John Marshall Law School and
Frank Kralicek, Graduate Assistant and student at John Marshall Law School for their assistance.
1. TUPAc AMARU SHAKUR, Soul'a's Story, on 2PACALYPSE Now (Jive Records 1992). The
album contains half a dozen songs telling stories of violence by and toward police. The album
jacket contains the following inscription: "[F--k] all Police, Skinheads, Nazi whatever! !" TUPAC
AMARU SHAKUR, 2PACALYPSE Now (Jive Records 1992).
2. Chuck Philips, Texas Death Renews Debate Over Violent Rap Lyrics, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1992, at Al. Howard's lawyer described Howard to the jury as a "'rap addict who lived, breathed and
worshipped' the violent lifestyle portrayed in gangsta rap." Chuck Philips, Rap Defense Doesn't Stop
Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1993, at Fl [hereinafter Philips, Rap Defense].
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"just snapped.",3  He loaded his nine-millimeter pistol and shot and killed
Davidson.4
In the sentencing phase of Howard's capital murder trial, he blamed
"gangsta rap' 5 for influencing his behavior.6  Although Howard was
sentenced to death, many jury members believed the music affected Howard's
action.
The alleged influence of Tupac Shakur's music upon Howard had
become the basis of a multi-million dollar lawsuit filed by Davidson's widow
against Shakur's estate, Shakur's record label Interscope Records, and the
label's former parent company, Time Warner.7  In the complaint, Mrs.
Davidson accused Shakur and the companies that marketed Shakur's music of
gross negligence in manufacturing and distributing music that incites
"imminent lawless action."
8
Mrs. Davidson's lawsuit raised serious First Amendment questions.
Although First Amendment protection of artistic expression is generally
recognized, is it absolute? Could gangsta rap fall into the category of
"political speech" and thereby receive the highest level of judicial protection?
Could a court interpret the very exacting "incitement" doctrine in a way that
some "gangsta rap" songs, and other music claimed to incite lawlessness,
could lose First Amendment protection? What would be the implications of a
court decision that abrogates First Amendment protection for a given song
and imposes liability upon the artist and his or her producers for any harm
resulting from the song's "incitement?"
This Article attempts to answer these questions.9 First, this Article
defines "political speech" and analyzes the virtually absolute First
3. Philips, Rap Defense, supra note 2, at F1.
4. Id.
5. "Gangsta rap" is a popular genre of rap music which reflects the violent, often angry lives of
black inner-city youths. Newsweek magazine described gangsta rap as "selling images of black-on-
black crime to mainstream America." John Leland, Criminal Records, NEWSwEEK, Nov. 29, 1993, at
60, 63. Billboard magazine referred to conduct associated with gangsta rap as "an antisocial exercise
in self-delusion [leading] to the death of conscience, the corruption of the spirit, and ultimately the
destruction of the individual and community." Culture, Violence and the Cult of the Unrepentant
Rogue, BILLBOARD, Dec. 25, 1993, at 5, 108.
6. Howard specifically identified Tupac Shakur's music from his album 2pacalypse Now as the
major impetus for his actions. See Philips, Rap Defense, supra note 2, at Fl.
7. See Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., 25 Media L. Rep. 1705 (S.D. Tex. 1997); see also Chuck
Philips, Testing the Limits, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1992, at F 1.
8. Plaintiffs Complaint at XI, Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., No. Civ. A. V-94-006 (D. Tex.
Filed Dec. 1, 1993) (complaint on file with Vanderbilt Law Review). Mrs. Davidson's lawyer stated,
"[i]t is time giant corporations were stopped from shamelessly making money off music designed to
incite impressionable young men to shoot and kill cops." Geordie Greig, American Widow Sues for
'Murder Under the Influence of Rap', SUNDAY TIMES (London), Oct. 25, 1992, at 22.
9. This article only deals with music claimed to incite violence, focusing on gangsta rap. It does
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Amendment protection traditionally applied to such speech. This Article
further explores the ramifications of recent Supreme Court opinions that
appear to abrogate the high level of constitutional protection traditionally
afforded political speech.
Second, this Article explains how the advocacy-incitement doctrine fits
into the construct of First Amendment protection for political speech. It
examines the "clear and present danger test" for unlawful incitement and the
First Amendment values reflected within such a test. It further explores
varying interpretations of the Supreme Court's most recent version of the
"clear and present danger" test, as set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio.'0
Third, this Article reviews past applications of the advocacy-incitement
doctrine in cases where plaintiffs claimed to have been victimized by violent
acts allegedly incited by some form of entertainment. It reconciles prevailing
interpretations of the current Brandenburg test with the holdings in those
cases. This Article then extracts the crucial factors that assist courts in
determining whether speech constitutes unlawful incitement or lawful
advocacy.
Fourth, this Article argues many gangsta rap lyrics constitute political
speech. However, the application of current interpretations of the clear and
present danger test to gangsta rap demonstrates that, based on the facts of a
given case and the respective court's interpretation of the standard, a court
could arbitrarily hold some gangsta rap songs constitute unlawful
incitement. Such a holding would justify civil liability under traditional
tort law against the rap artist and producer for any harm resulting from that
incitement. This result would be likely if a trial court were to interpret
recent Supreme Court holdings as applying a less stringent standard than is
traditionally applied to political speech.
Finally, this Article discusses the problems resulting from a finding of
liability, including the threat of overinclusive censorship. Altogether, courts
must hold steadfast to traditional First Amendment standards in analyzing
musical lyrics that constitute political speech in order to preserve the integrity
of First Amendment freedom. A traditional analysis requires a return to the
strict interpretation of the Brandenburg test and vehement judicial protection
of radical and anti-establishment speech.
not deal with music containing obscenity or profanity. Furthermore, this article chiefly addresses the
First Amendment ramifications of finding musicians civilly liable for injuries resulting from alleged
incitement to violence. Therefore, while portions of this article may apply to any method of
restricting certain categories of music, the entirety only applies to the imposition of civil damages in a
given case.
10. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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II. POLITICAL SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In First Amendment jurisprudence, courts and scholars have recognized
a hierarchy of constitutionally protected speech. 1 At the top of this hierarchy
rests "political speech." 12 The cases establish a clear paradigm that provides
for absolute protection of any speech supporting or promoting a political
position, activity or change, regardless of its specific content. 13  Political
speech distinctly includes challenges to the status quo-advocacy of the
notion that current societal, governmental, and political practices and policies
are misguided or inaccurate. "Political speech" is not limited to literal
campaign or governmental rhetoric. Courts have interpreted political speech
to encompass any kind of speech that addresses societal values and actually
evokes action. 14 Moreover, the First Amendment especially protects speech
that expresses unpopular ideas and beliefs. 15 The Supreme Court emphasizes
11. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991) (suggesting nude
dancing performed as expressive conduct lies in the "outer perimeters of the First Amendment");
Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1020 (1987) (noting information in a Hustler
magazine article would be subject to less than strict scrutiny because the type of protected speech it
encompasses merits less than absolute protection); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50,
70-71 (1976) (holding adult films may receive a different, lesser classification of protection than
afforded other expression); see also Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory:
The Beautiful, the Sublime and the First Amendment, 1987 WIs. L. REv. 221.
12. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957)) ("The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order
'to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people."'); see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) ("Suppression of the right ... to clamor and contend for or
against change... muzzles one of the very [rights] the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and
deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials."); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983).
13. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). "If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion .... " Id.; see also Hess
v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969); McCollum
v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988).
14. See generally Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (stating
pornography would normally constitute mere commercial speech, and thus be subject to less
constitutional protection than traditional political speech). By suggesting pornography had the power
to make the audience act, the proponents of a ban against pornographic theaters defeated their own
claim by essentially calling the pornography "political speech." See generally id.
15. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (holding speech does not fall
outside First Amendment protection "merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of
their hearers"); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963) (observing the First Amendment protects
speech regardless of "the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered");
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (noting radical and even dangerous ideas must be
tolerated in a democratic society).
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the need to shelter advocacy-particularly advocacy of unpopular or
offensive political speech-because such advocacy is the handmaiden of
democracy.16 Without freedom to advocate change, societies cannot progress
and representative systems fail to function as planned.' 7 The Supreme Court
has frequently reiterated the necessity for an "open marketplace of ideas,"'
18
that must neither be sacrificed nor compromised by the suppression of anti-
government expression.
Despite this compelling doctrine of absolute protection for pure political
speech, the Supreme Court has applied a lesser degree of protection to
political speech in two cases. In Burson v. Freeman19 and R.A.V v. City of St.
Paul,20 the Court allowed countervailing governmental interests to outweigh
First Amendment claims in a manner inconsistent with the traditional absolute
protection paradigm.2' This lesser standard has not yet been fully explored,
nor has it been put to a strenuous constitutional test. However, some judges
may interpret Burson and R.A. V as binding authority for every case involving
political speech.
16. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (stating "such freedom will ultimately produce
a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity ...in the belief that no other approach would
comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.").
Advocacy of change, for example, fosters "a certain type of citizen (one unafiaid of change) necessary
for democratic self-govemance." Id.; see also Tom Hentoff, Note, Speech, Harm and Self-
Government: Understanding the Ambit of the Clear and Present Danger Test, 91 COLuM. L. REV.
1453, 1467 (1991).
17. Free speech and the ability to challenge the majority is so essential to proper functioning of
the democratic, majoritarian system the framers created, that protection of that speech is of the highest
systemic concern. Consider this famous dictum of Justice Holmes:
[M]en have come to believe.., that the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
18. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas."); see also Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
19. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
20. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
21. A detailed discussion of the lesser standards utilized in Burson and R.A. V. is beyond the
scope of this article. It is not yet clear that the lesser standard would apply to all cases involving
political speech, or even to any case which does not have the specific fact patterns of Burson and
R.A. V. However, the existence of the lesser standard is important to note, because a court might seize
upon it as "the new standard," and apply it to a case focusing on gangsta rap. Such a test would likely
prove fatal to gangsta rap and any political speech in its genre. See infra Part V. For a more detailed
analysis of the standards used in Burson and R.A. V., see George A. Size & Gibana R. Britton, Is There
Hate Speech?: R.A.V. and Mitchell in the Context of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 21 OHIO N.U.
L. REv. 913 (1995).
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III. THE ADVOCACY-INCITEMENT DOCTRINE
Traditional constitutional jurisprudence permits suppression of political
speech only when that advocacy "is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."
2 2
Speech that advocates imminent lawlessness falls outside the protective ambit
of the First Amendment because such speech contravenes the systemic values
the First Amendment protects.23 At times, there exists only a fine line
between lawful, protected "advocacy" and unlawful, unprotected
"incitement."2 4  In Brandenburg v. Ohio,25 the Supreme Court attempted to
demarcate the defining characteristics of lawful advocacy versus those of
unlawful incitement. The court distinguished mere advocacy from incitement
that actually prepares and inspires a group or individual to take such action.
2 6
A. The Brandenburg Test
In order to define speech appropriately labeled "incitement," and
thereby deny First Amendment protection, the Court originally developed the
"clear and present danger" test.27  The test's current application under
22. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Some scholars have honed this definition,
defining incitement as the advocacy of purely political or ideological crimes committed to be
imminently. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment:
In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1181 (1982).
23. The Supreme Court has justified its creation of narrow exceptions to First Amendment
protections including an exception for speech that incites illegal conduct. The speech categorized
within the exceptions creates discordant chaos and social disorder without contributing any reciprocal
benefit to the marketplace of ideas. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)
("[S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.").
24. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 572 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice
Jackson noted "it is not always easy to distinguish teaching or advocacy in the sense of incitement
from teaching or advocacy in the sense of exposition or explanation. It is a question of fact in each
case." Id.
25. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
26. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (construing Noto v. United States, 367 U.S.
290, 297-98 (1961)). "[T]he mere abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even moral
necessity for a resort to force and violence is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and
steeling it to such action." Id. at 448.
27. The clear and present danger test has had a rocky development. Justice Holmes first
mentioned the test in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), but the test was apparently an
evidentiary test. See Frank R. Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Schenck to
Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 SuP. CT. REV. 41, 42. The Court did not afford the "clear and
present danger test" constitutional status until much later, after a series of concurring and dissenting
opinions by Justices Holmes and Brandeis. Even then, the test was revised until Brandenburg, which
represents the last formulation by the Supreme Court in this area. Id.
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Brandenburg holds two requirements. First, in order to constitute unlawful
incitement, the speech must be "directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action., 28  Second, the speech must be "likely to incite or produce
such action.",29 Therefore, when applying the test, a court must determine 1)
the speech was explicitly or implicitly designed to encourage the occurrence
of the unlawful act; 2) the unlawful act sanctioned by the speech was a likely
and foreseeable 30 result of the speech; and 3) the speech was directed to incite,
and likely to result in, imminent illegal conduct.
31
B. Interpretation of the Brandenburg Test
The Supreme Court has repeatedly revised the test for unlawful
32advocacy. In addition, the test has borne varying interpretations among First
Amendment scholars. Therefore, a brief survey of the prevailing theories is
necessary to correctly apply the test.
1. "Directed to" Inciting Unlawful Conduct
At first glance, this requirement of the Brandenburg test appears to seek
out the speaker's specific intent to incite unlawful conduct. However, many
courts and scholars agree, the First Amendment protects almost all speech
regardless of intent because only speech which presents a real threat of true
harm justifies invocation of the test.33 Nevertheless, Brandenburg does
require some showing of intent, whether explicit or implicit, in conjunction
28. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969) (emphasis added).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Foreseeability tends to aid the court in determining whether speech would likely result in the
violent act advocated. See generally Peter D. Csathy, Takin' The Rap: Should Artists Be Held
Accountable for Their Violent Recorded Speech?, CoMM. LAW, Spring 1992, at 7, available in
WESTLAW, JLR database.
31. The "imminence" requirement has received much attention and varying interpretations. See
infra notes 61-73 and accompanying text. Although not an "official" requirement of the
Brandenburg test, the gravity of the unlawful conduct advocated often plays a role in determining
whether certain speech constitutes incitement. The more grave the danger incited by speech, the
higher the state interest is in preventing and suppressing the danger. See, e.g., Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 377-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[E]ven imminent danger cannot justify
resort to prohibition of these functions essential to effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is
relatively serious."); see also Redish, supra note 22, at 1180 (noting that "if the substantive evil
involves violence to persons, it is only reasonable that society will be less willing to risk that ultimate
consequence than when the 'evil' in question is illegal by walking on the grass."). This article does
not specifically address this issue because the conduct allegedly incited by most gangsta rap generally
constitutes serious crime.
32. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
33. Id.
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with the other requirements of the test in order to justify revocation of First
Amendment protection.34
Intent, based on whether the speech is "directed to" inciting unlawful
conduct 35 can be demonstrated in several ways. First, direct, as opposed to
indirect, advocacy of the illegal conduct demonstrates intent to incite specific
lawless action.36 Direct advocacy is manifested in the speaker's explicit
urging of the listener to commit a certain act.37 Such an urging raises a
presumption that the speaker intended the act to occur.38 While indirect
advocacy may lead someone to commit a crime, the absence of clarity and
direction by the speaker generally would not expose such speech to
annulment of First Amendment protections. To deny protection to indirect
advocacy would sweep aside constitutional boundaries and approach a state of
unlawful censorship and subordinate First Amendment values to remote
concerns of possible indirect injuries or harms. 39 This is the very essence of
censorship.
The requirement that speech be directed to inciting illegal acts can also
be demonstrated by a high level of specificity in the speech.40 Ambiguous
speech presents no clear threat of real harm. It therefore warrants full First
Amendment protection. The Supreme Court exemplified this point in Hess v.
Indiana,4' in which the defendant was charged with incitement for allegedly
saying, "We'll take the [f-----.g] street later,' 42 while police were attempting to
clear the street. The statement was not directed toward any specific individual
or group 43 nor directed to any specific time or method of "taking the street."
The very ambiguity of the words used defeated the specific intent
requirement. 44 The Court accordingly held the ambiguity of the statement
sheltered it from any challenge to First Amendment protection.45
34. See Steven Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25
UCLA L. REV. 915, 947 n.205 (1978).
35. Redish, supra note 22, at 1178.
36. See id. Martin Redish provides an example that distinguishes direct and indirect advocacy:
"[Y]ou should kill that cop" represents direct advocacy, while "that cop harassed me yesterday"
reflects a statement of indirect advocacy, either of which could lead to an unlawful act. Id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-109 (1973).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 107.
43. See id.
44. See Csathy, supra note 30.
45. See Hess, 414 U.S. at 109.
CA TCHIN' THE HEAT OF THE BEAT
2. Likelihood of Unlawful Conduct
This requirement has previously received much less attention. As with
all aspects of the Brandenburg test, the requirement is strongly fact-driven.46
Although not conclusive, the actual occurrence of a harm similar to that
advocated in the speech ordinarily indicates the specific harm was likely to
occur. In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,47 the speaker called for a
boycott of white merchants in an effort to achieve racial equality48 and
threatened any listener who did not join the boycott.49 The Supreme Court
held the speech merited strong First Amendment protection and stressed that
directly after the speech was made, no violence actually ensued.5°
Understandably, if lawless action does follow the speech, the fact-finder may
more easily conclude the speech would likely incite such behavior.
5'
However, this argument may be fatally flawed because it displaces the
emphasis of the test. Once a court determines actual lawless action indicates
likelihood, the test changes focus-from the expression itself to reaction to
the expression.52  In order to ensure the test properly examines the
constitutionality of the language, other factors must be used.
The foreseeability of unlawful conduct incited by otherwise protected
speech leads to the likelihood requirement.53  In Weirum v. RKO General,
Inc. , a rock radio station with a large teenage following conducted a live
radio contest that urged its young listeners to engage in a street race in order
to win prizes for being the first to locate a disc jockey who was driving
around town.55 One of the minors, while chasing the disc jockey, negligently
46. Redish, supra note 22, at 1184.
47. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
48. NAACP v. Clairbome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 899 (1982).
49. The speaker stated, "[i]f we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna
break your damn neck." Id. at 902.
50. See Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 928. The lawsuit alleged the speech led to several acts of
violence and an unlawful boycott. Id. However, these acts did not occur at or sufficiently close to the
time of the speech to warrant a finding of "incitement." Id. Since the speech did not meet the
requirements of the Brandenburg test, the Court treated it as political speech and stated, "[w]hen such
appeals do not incite lawless action, they must be regarded as protected speech." Id.
51. The Court stated "[i]f the speech, which included strong language, had been followed by
acts of violence, a substantial question would be presented whether [the speaker] could be held liable
for the consequences of that unlawful conduct." Id. at 928. The Court believed speech advocating
bad acts, followed immediately by those acts, would increase the likelihood of finding unlawful
incitement. Id.
52. See, e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
53. See, e.g., Csathy, supra note 30.
54. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
55. Weirum v. RKO General, 539 P.2d 36,43 (Cal. 1975).
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killed the driver of a vehicle.56 The California Appellate Court imposed
liability and held the sense of urgency conveyed by the broadcaster created an
unreasonable risk of harm to its young listeners.57 The court also held it was
foreseeable that an accident would occur as a result.58 Foreseeability will be
measured by the facts and circumstances of each case. For example, if the
speaker targets an individual or a group prone to violent behavior and
vulnerable to outside influences that might exacerbate such violent proclivity,
it may be highly foreseeable that certain speech will likely incite unlawful
conduct.
3. Imminence: The Threshold Requirement
Most scholarly writing on the Brandenburg test has focused on the
imminence requirement.59  These scholars often criticize courts for never
having clearly defined imminence. 60 This criticism has created two separate
interpretations of imminence. First, most scholars citing Brandenburg and the
Brandeis-Holmes concurrence in Whitney v. California,6 1 narrow imminence
to "temporal imminence." In their view, speech only equals unlawful
incitement if immediately upon its utterance, the incited unlawful activity
ensues. Justice Brandeis justified this very strict requirement as fostering the
"open marketplace of ideas" 62  by acknowledging the power of
counterspeech 63 -speech reflecting an opposing viewpoint from the speech in
question offered to correct the fallacies of the initial speech. 64 If there is time
for curative counterspeech between the inciting speech and the unlawful
56. Id.
57. Id. at 47. Although Weirum does not mention the Brandenburg test, the case has
traditionally been discussed in other incitement cases. See, e.g., McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal.
Rptr. 187, 195 (Ct. App. 1988); Olivia N. v. National Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1981).
Professor David Anderson of the University of Texas School of Law stated Weirum would be a viable
precedent for the Davidson case, discussed supra Part I. See Janet Elliot, Slain Trooper's Family
Seeks Damages from Rapper, LEGAL TIMES, July 26, 1993, at 10.
58. Weirum, 539 P.2d at 47.
59. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 22, at 1180-8 1. See generally Note, Modern-Day Sirens: Rock
Lyrics and the First Amendment, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 777 (1990); Tom Hentoff, Note, Speech, Harm
and Self-Government: Understanding the Ambit of the Clear and Present Danger Test, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1453 (1991); Jon C. Wolfe, Comment, Sex, Violence and Profanity: Rap Music and the First
Amendment, 44 MERCER L. REv. 667 (1993).
60. For an illustration of how courts have treated this requirement differently, see Redish, supra
note 22, at 1166-76, 1180-82.
61. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
62. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
63. Id.
64. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377. "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech,
not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression." Id.
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conduct it incites, then the conduct cannot occur imminently. Only when
violent acts are so imminent there is no time for response and discussion and
thus no chance for the truth to prevail can speech be suppressed. 65 Using this
temporal interpretation, the Brandenburg test is nearly impossible to meet.
Moreover, in virtually every case where it has been applied, the speech has
been protected.66
Professor Redish has proposed a more flexible interpretation of the
imminence requirement. He would use a balancing test, contrasting the
state's interests in preventing harm to itself and its citizens with the
constitutional interest in protecting freedom of expression. 67 For example, if
the state's interests are extraordinarily high and the violence threatened is
substantially serious, it is much more likely that such violence will occur.
This approach places more weight on the gravity of the potential harm than on
the necessity for strict temporal imminence.68 Imminence thus loses its
temporal element and bows to the strength of other factors that indicate a
strong likelihood of incitement. 69  Applying Redish's broad balancing
procedure, direct and forceful advocacy of a very serious offense can and
should be suppressed without a strong showing of imminence. 70 However, in
the case of indirect advocacy of a lesser offense, much stronger proof of
65. Some scholars, in challenging the viability of this concept, note that the exigencies of any
given situation may destroy the effectiveness of this theory. See Redish, supra note 22, at 1162.
"There may be inadequate time or opportunity for response, the 'false' speech may be more
persuasively phrased, or the audience may simply not be sufficiently sophisticated or sufficiently
interested to ascertain the difference [between the true speech and the false speech]." Id.
66. See Tom Hentoff, Note, Speech, Harm and Self-Government: Understanding the Ambit of
the Clear and Present Danger Test, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1457 (1991) (noting between 1937 and
1951, the Supreme Court used the "clear and present danger test" only three times to restrict speech,
and the Supreme Court has never invoked the Brandenburg formulation to restrict speech); see also
Peter Alan Block, Note, Modern-Day Sirens: Rock Lyrics and the First Amendment, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 777, 797 n.124 (1990).
67. See Redish, supra note 22, at 1180.
68. See id. at 1180-81. "[R]equiring true imminence in every case is unrealistic and unduly
insensitive to society's legitimate interest in self-protection ... [a] stringent imminence standard
unduly restricts authorities' ability to deter criminal conduct." Id.
69. See id. at 1183, n.98. For example:
in the area of judicial contempt, it would seem that the words of the clear and
present danger formula do not lend themselves to a thorough analysis of all the
competing factors. Perhaps a standard which asks whether the speech in question
was highly likely to cause severe disruption of the judicial process or to the rights
of the litigants to a fair trial would more accurately focus the court's attentions.
Id.
70. See id.
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imminence is required to suppress the possible offense.7 1 This is an
interpretation of Learned Hand's test expressed in Dennis v. United States.72
Redish's approach may be criticized for being so flexible that it
compromises the sanctity of First Amendment values. The Framers
established the First Amendment to protect unpopular or radical expression
from government suppression as long as such expression did not present a
clear and present danger.73  Protection of political speech must remain
absolute in order to maintain the inalienable freedoms inherent in the
Constitution. Without the open marketplace of ideas and the free exchange of
expression, a free society will ultimately fail. Redish directly undermines this
constitutional principle by allowing government the power to determine
which speech should be suppressed based on its view of societal interests.
This is precisely the evil that the constitutional Framers sought to avoid in
creating the First Amendment. In order to afford political speech the
protection required by the Constitution, a stricter interpretation of imminence
is necessary.
Under either interpretation, the outcome in any given case depends
heavily on its facts and the propensity of the court. Regardless of whether the
court takes a strict or broad approach to the Brandenburg test, the test remains
quite strenuous. The test is necessarily speech-protective because freedom of
speech is so central to the Constitution and to the concept of democracy. To
protect the sanctity of that freedom and prevent it from eroding, courts must
begin the Brandenburg analysis with the strong presumption that political
speech merits the highest First Amendment protection. Additionally, to
further guarantee the protection of free speech, the burden of proof must lie
with the party attempting to revoke First Amendment protection.74
IV. HISTORICAL APPLICATION OF INCITEMENT THEORY TO MUSIC AND
SIMILAR FORMS OF ENTERTAINMENT
In recent years, several plaintiffs have claimed that music, television and
other forms of entertainment have incited violent behavior, directly causing
personal injury to themselves or their loved ones.75 These claims have gained
71. Seeid. at 1181-82.
72. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (citing United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d
201, 212 (2dCir. 1950)).
73. See id. at 520-521.
74. See F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 133 (1982).
75. See, e.g., Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding the game "Dungeons
and Dragons" did not incite a young boy to commit suicide); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 814
F.2d 1017, 1027 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding a magazine article describing "autoerotic asphyxiation" did
not incite a young man to perform the act); Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. Ga. 1991),
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little success.7 6 Before examining the exemplary cases, we note courts have
clearly afforded music general First Amendment protection.77 Thus, musical
lyrics presumptively do not constitute unlawful incitement. Therefore
plaintiffs face a substantial burden when attempting to prove incitement. This
example explains why very few litigants have succeeded in establishing that
entertainment has incited violent behavior.78
A. The Suicide Cases
In the past decade, three notable cases arose where plaintiffs blamed
heavy metal music for inciting the suicides of their sons. In McCollum v.
ayf'd, 958 F.2d 1084 (11 th Cir. 1992) (holding rock musician Ozzy Osboume's music did not incite a
young man to commit suicide); Vance v. Judas Priest, 16 Media L. Rep. 2241 (Nev. Dist. Ct. 1989)
(holding the music of the band Judas Priest did not incite suicide); Zamora v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (holding the television network's violent programming did not
incite a boy to shoot his neighbor); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988)
(holding the music of Ozzy Osboume did not incite a young man to commit suicide); Bill v. Superior
Court, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625 (Ct. App. 1982) (noting the violent movie Boulevard Nights did not incite
an audience member to shoot another audience member outside the theatre, and holding the movie
producer did not have a duty to protect the plaintiff from audience members who were predisposed to
violence); Olivia N. v. National Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding the television
movie Born Innocent did not incite the plaintiffs assailants to rape her in the manner depicted in the
movie); Phillips v. Syufy Enter., 20 Media L. Rep. 1199 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that the
movie Boyz In The Hood did not constitute incitement); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,
536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989) (finding the violent gang movie, The WarTiors, did not incite an
audience member to stab a young man); DeFilippo v. National Broad. Co., Inc., 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I.
1982) (holding the First Amendment barred parents' suit against broadcasting company when their
child died from imitating a hanging stunt performed on The Tonight Show with Johnny Carson).
76. See supra note 66.
77. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) ("Entertainment, as
well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio
and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, fall within the First
Amendment guarantee."); Vance v. Judas Priest, 16 Media L. Rep. 2241, 2244 (Nev. Dist. Ct. 1989)
("Music, lyrics and videos, and the values which they promote ... are protected by the First
Amendment."); Olivia N. v. National Broad. Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1977) ("Material communicated
by the public media ... is generally to be accorded protection under the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.").
78. However, in 1998, two courts seemingly became more flexible in allowing claims
against movie producers to go forward. In Beasley v. State, 502 S.E.2d 235, 238 (Ga. 1998), the
Georgia Supreme Court allowed the movie Natural Born Killers (Warner Bros. 1994) to be
shown in its entirety to the jury in an attempt to determine Beasley's "bent of mind." Also, in
Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1998), the Court of Appeal of Louisiana held
the victim of an assault stated a viable cause of action against the producers of the movie Natural
Born Killers. Id. at 691. Although the court did not decide the merits of the First Amendment defense
by the defendant producers, it held the claims alleged by the plaintiff brought the case into the
incitement exception to the First Amendment. Id. Additionally, a murder and an attempted murder
have been found to have been inspired by the movie Scream (Dimension Films 1996). See Linda
Deutsch, No Screaming Allowed, Judge Issues a Gag Order, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 4, 1999, at 8;
Teen Gets 45 Years for Attacking Couple, DALLAS MoRNING NEWS, Dec. 22, 1998, at 10A.
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CBS, Inc.79  and Waller v. Osbourne,80  plaintiffs claimed that Ozzy
Osboume's song "Suicide Solution"81 led their respective sons to kill
themselves. Each plaintiff claimed along with the overall advocacy of suicide
in the song, certain masked lyrics directly encouraged the listener to, "[g]et
the gun and try it. Shoot, shoot, shoot."8' 2 Both courts determined the song
did not constitute unlawful incitement.8 3 The Waller court noted the song was
not intended to produce acts of suicide, nor was it likely to cause such acts. 4
The McCollum court reached similar findings, holding beyond the alleged
subliminal lyrics, no portion of the song constituted any kind of specific
command.85  Neither court felt the "subliminal" message claim carried
enough weight to justify a finding of incitement. 86  Furthermore, the
McCollum court held poetic devises used in music could not cause a rational
person to interpret music as a directive such that it would comprise
incitement8 7  Additionally, both courts noted the boys had emotional
problems and ultimately weakened any plaintiffs' claims that the music, rather
than other intervening factors, caused the suicides. 88
79. 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1988).
80. 763 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. Ga. 1991), affd, 958 F.2d 1084 (1 lth Cir. 1992).
81. "Suicide Solution" advocates suicide as a viable option for those involved in excessive
alcohol consumption. McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 191 n.5.
82. Id.
83. The MeCollum case was dismissed. McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 198. The Waller court
granted summary judgment for the defendants. Waller, 763 F. Supp. at 1144. Note neither court
specifically stated the lyrics constituted political speech. In fact, an excellent argument exists that the
advocacy of suicide lacks the kind of urging for political or social change or awareness which
generally encompasses political speech. Arguably, the mere fact that the advocacy allegedly invoked
the act of suicide elevated the speech to a higher level of protection, which explains the court's
application of the incitement doctrine. See generally analysis in American Mini Theatres, supra note
14.
84. Waller, 763 F. Supp. at 1151. The court also noted the song was not specifically directed at
any person or group of persons, and that no person could rationally infer the song as inciting suicide.
Id. In applying the Brandenburg test, these factors demonstrate intent and likelihood, respectively.
85. McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
86. See, e.g., Waller, 763 F. Supp. at 1148-50.
87. McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 194. "No rational person would or could believe [that musical
lyrics are anything more than figurative expressions] nor would they mistake musical lyrics and
poetry for literal commands or directives to immediate action." Id.
88. Id. at 189 (describing one of the young men as having "a problem with alcohol abuse as well
as serious emotional problems."); Waller, 763 F. Supp. at 1145 n.1 (depicting the plaintiffs as
"troubled adolescents"). In both cases, the plaintiffs claimed Ozzy Osbourne knew his audience
primarily consisted of troubled teens who were "extremely susceptible to the external influence and
directions from a cult figure such as Osbourne." McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 190. The plaintiffs
argued because Osbourne knew these characteristics of his audience, injuries resulting from directives
in his songs were foreseeable. The court held in favor of defendants because the plaintiffs did not
prove Osborne's audience consisted primarily of troubled teens and because the song did not contain
actual "command[s]." Id at 189, 194.
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In Vance v. Judas Priest,89 the plaintiffs claimed Judas Priest's song
"Better by You, Better Than Me" 90 contained subliminal messages that
incited two young men to attempt suicide. 9' Rejecting the plaintiffs' claim,
the court ruled that subliminal messages were not entitled to First Amendment
protection.92 In addition, the court held intervening factors, rather than the
song itself, caused the deaths.93
In these "suicide cases," the claims that subliminal messages primarily
caused incitement to suicide severely weakened the plaintiffs' cases. As in
Vance, the courts have made clear music is generally protected under the First
Amendment, and absent direct language encouraging the suicides or other
aggravating factors, no finding of incitement is justified.
94
B. Other Cases Involving Claims of Incitement by the Media
A number of plaintiffs have claimed certain forms of entertainment
incite violent acts.95 Few have made a particularly strong impact in the
entertainment and legal worlds. In Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, 96 a case presenting one of the first claims that entertainment had
incited violent behavior, the plaintiff was a minor who claimed he had
become "involuntarily addicted to and 'completely subliminally intoxicated
by the extensive viewing of television violence broadcast by the major
television networks."'' 97  The plaintiff, who shot and killed an elderly
neighbor, claimed the networks' negligent programming incited him to
commit murder.98 However, because the plaintiff did not specify any
89. 16 Media L. Rep. 2241 (Nev. Dist. Ct. 1989).
90. JUDAS PRIEST, Better by You, Better Than Me, on STAINED CLASS (Columbia 1978).
91. Vance, 16 Media L. Rep. at 2244. The two young men had been drinking beer and smoking
pot all afternoon. Id. Suddenly falling into a fit of violence, they ran out to a church playground with
a sawed-off shotgun and each shot himself under the chin. Id. One young man died instantly; the
other died three years later due to complications. Id; see also, Chuck Philips, Trial to Focus on
Subliminal Messages in Rock, L.A. TIMES, July 16,1990, at Fl.
92. Vance, 16 Media L. Rep. at 2247-49. In fact, the court held the plaintiffs could neither
prove the band had intentionally placed the messages on the album, nor the alleged messages caused
the death of the two "troubled young men." Id. at 2256.
93. The court noted the two young men had problems with drugs, alcohol, school, family, and
work, and in light of these intervening problems, the music was not a "substantial factor" leading to
the boys' suicide. Id. at 2256-57.
94. See supra notes 75 and 77 and accompanying text. Also, in April, 1999, Marilyn Manson
cancelled his remaining tour dates because of the high school shooting spree in Littleton, Colorado, on
April 20, 1999. Richard L. Eldredge, Manson Cancellations, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 29, 1999, at E2.
95. See supra notes 75, 79-80 and accompanying text.
96. 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
97. Zamora v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199, 200 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
98. Id.
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particular program or any precise call to action, the court rejected the claim.99
Moreover, the court noted because of the exacting scrutiny required in cases
challenging protected speech,' 00 it court could not justify a finding of general
incitement on what it viewed as an ambiguous claim.101 Furthermore, the
court reasoned the violent tendencies of a few viewers cannot rationalize a
general suppression of protected expression.'0 2
Another case, Olivia N v. National Broadcasting Co. 103 presented a less
ambiguous claim than Zamora. In that case, a young girl was gang-raped
with a beer bottle by four girls who allegedly got the idea from a similar scene
in a television movie.'°4 Both the court and the parties agreed the movie did
not contain the requisite call to action required for a successful incitement
claim-it merely depicted a scene without specifically encouraging its
replication. 0 5 Consequently, the suit was dismissed.1
0 6
In Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,0 7 the plaintiff's son accidentally
killed himself while performing "auto-erotic asphyxiation" as described in a
copy of Hustler magazine.'0 8 The plaintiff claimed the unnecessary detail in
the magazine incited her son to perform the act that resulted in his death.'0 9
The court rejected the plaintiff's claim, however, finding the article was
merely descriptive, and as such constituted neither advocacy nor
incitement." 0 The court further suggested incitement theory was improper as
a cause of action, and the less stringent scrutiny of the compelling interest test
may have been more appropriate."'
99. Id. at 204.
100. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
101. Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 206. "The imposition of such a generally undefined and
undefinable duty would be an unconstitutional exercise by this Court... [t]he First Amendment casts
a 'heavy burden' on those who seek to censor." Id.
102. Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 205. "There may be some persons about with such lawless and
violent proclivities, but that is an insufficient base upon which to erect, consistently with constitutional
values, a governmental power to force persons who wish to ventilate their dissident views into
avoiding particular forms of expression." Id.
103. 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1981).
104. Olivia N. v. National Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 890-91 (Ct. App. 1981).
105. In fact, in his opening statement, the plaintiffs attorney conceded that no incitement
existed. Id. at 890 n. 1. On this basis, upon motion by defendants, the court immediately dismissed
the case. Id. at 890.
106. Id. at 497.
107. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
108. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987).
109. Id. at 1023.
110. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1022-23. Furthermore, the court noted the article contained
numerous warnings against attempting to perform the practice for risk of death. Id. at 10 18-19.
111. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1020, 1023. The compelling interest test applies to content-based
restrictions of protected speech. Generally, it is not the appropriate test for alleged or proposed
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Only in Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.112 have any plaintiffs succeeded
on a modified claim of incitement. 1 3  In Weirum, the court noted risk of
injury resulting from the broadcaster's specific directive was entirely
foreseeable. 114  The court reasoned because the broadcast was live, the
unlawful conduct did occur imminently within the definition of any
interpretation of the Brandenburg test.1 15
The aforementioned jurisprudence reflects the fact that courts do not
easily nor lightly reach a finding of incitement. These cases demonstrate
courts will determine whether a certain claim presents unlawful incitement
under the standards of the Brandenburg test by considering the following
factors: (1) specificity of the language and the clarity of the directive;' 16 (2)
existence of a command to the audience rather than merely a description;117
(3) temporal imminence of conduct following the speech, made clearer upon
the existence of live speech rather than recorded;" 8 and (4) intervening
factors which supercede the effect of the speech. 19 Even where the courts
have not expressly applied Brandenburg, these factors directly translate into
the underlying components of that test. 120 In order to preserve the integrity of
First Amendment protections, courts have avoided flexible interpretations of
these factors. The protection provided by the First Amendment is so central
violations of traditional political speech. The Herceg court determined Hustler's article, though
generally protected, did not constitute political speech and was therefore most appropriately
subject to the compelling interest test. See id. However, recent Supreme Court cases appear to
afford political speech less protection. In those cases, the Court analyzed the restrictions on
speech under something akin to the compelling interest test. See supra notes 19-21 and
accompanying text. In the absence of or in conjunction with the advocacy-incitement dichotomy,
especially in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, the compelling interest test may apply to
restrict music allegedly inciting violent behavior. The better lawyer will prepare arguments under
both tests. This Article only refers to the Supreme Court's application of this less strict standard
and the consequences of such an application to "gangsta rap" issues. For a complete discussion
of the compelling interest doctrine and its application, see Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302
(1993). See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871-74 (1992); Carey v.
Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1976).
112. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975)
113. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975). See supra notes 56-59 and
accompanying text.
114. Weirum, 539 P.2d at 40. The broadcasters seemingly recognized the dangers and the
reckless driving that the announcement might incite, as they warned their adult listeners to "get your
kids out of the street." Id. at 38.
115. Although Weirum did not apply the Brandenburg test, it is often cited to in incitement
cases involving the finding of foreseeability. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
116. See Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 202.
117. See Olivia N., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888; see also Herceg, 814 F.2d 1017.
118. See Weirum, 539 P.2d at 40.
119. See supra Part I.B.
120. See id.
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to the viability of the Constitution and the open marketplace of ideas121 that a
challenge to its protective ambit would be met with the court's most exacting
scrutiny. 122
V. THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST APPLIED TO GANGSTA RAP
Gangsta rap music-which often describes violent scenes of murder,
rape, drug abuse and other aspects of inner-city life-has in recent years come
under fire for inciting young people to perform the violent acts described in its
lyrics. 123  The Ozzy Osboume and Judas Priest cases, 124 though based on
claims of incitement from music lyrics, cannot serve as precedent for gangsta
rap analysis. Instead, those cases grapple extensively with subliminal
messages-an issue not applicable to the gangsta rap claims. Therefore, a
more refined analysis of Brandenburg is required, using the factors
established in the cited cases. Because the Brandenburg test only identifies
political speech as being exempt from First Amendment protection, it must
first be determined whether gangsta rap constitutes political speech.
A. Gangsta Rap as Political Speech
There is a strong argument that gangsta rap is a form of political
expression. 25 Gangsta rap often describes serious social problems in an effort
to increase public awareness and to protest the status quo. Common themes
include drug abuse, teen pregnancy, gang violence, police brutality and the
hardships of ghetto life. Rap artists sing with an eye towards black solidarity
121. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
122. The United States Supreme Court has often referred to the first amendment protection
owed political speech as "exacting scrutiny." See, e.g., Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Found., 525 U.S. 1, 16 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995);
Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (referring to
"highest scrutiny").
123. Critics of gangsta rap look to "cut down the violent, misogynistic and racist lyrics in
vogue in the genre." Richard Harrington, For Rap, Some Arresting Developments, WASH. POST,
Dec. 29, 1993, at C7. The recent attacks on Ice-T, a rap artist, arc representative of the censure of
gangsta rap. On July 28, 1992, Ice T allowed Time Warner, his producer, to pull a controversial,
anti-police rap song from release in order to avoid the threat of lawsuits and boycotts against
Time Warner. Gil Griffin, The Censorship Thing, BILLBOARD, Nov. 28, 1992, at R4. In 1993,
Time Warner refused to release Ice-T's "Home Invasion" for similar reasons, a move which
prompted Ice-T to leave Time Warner for another label. Harrington, Arresting Developments,
WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1993, at C7. All major record labels have formed lyric review
committees, many of which have pulled controversial violent songs from rap records in order to
prevent the risk of liability. Gil Griffin, The Censorship Thing, BILLBOARD, Nov. 28, 1992, at
R4.
124. See supra notes 86 and 89.
125. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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and societal change. 126 Many gangsta rap artists claim by shedding light on
current desperate conditions, they can encourage peace among inner-city
groups, and ultimately, social and governmental redress. 27 Thus, if gangsta
rappers use violent language to increase awareness and advocate social
change-even if the words chosen are offensive or gratuitous 12 8-the speech
falls within this protected category of political speech. 29  Gangsta rappers
would be wise to cloak themselves in the highly protective blanket of
advocacy, thereby subjecting any challenge to their First Amendment
protected speech to extraordinarily strict judicial scrutiny.
B. Applying the Clear and Present Danger Test
If lyrics constitute "political speech," a proper analysis must ask whether
these otherwise protected lyrics fall outside the protective scope of the First
Amendment because they incite unlawful conduct. 30  Assuming the song
126. See Comment, Sex, Violence, and Profanity: Rap Music and the First Amendment,
44 MERCER L. REv. 667, 674 (1993) (noting much of rap music advocates black separatism and
working within the current governmental structure to effectuate change).
127. For example, rapper Snoop Doggy Dogg speaks reverently of the day Los Angeles
gangs called a truce (April 29, 1992): "[elverybody was together. That's what my music's going
for-to stop you banging for a second. Listen to my music and get on another vibe." Leland,
supra note 5, at 64.
128. Courts have repeatedly stated unpopular or offensive speech merits First Amendment
protection of the highest class in order to preserve the open marketplace of ideas. See supra note
15.
129. As discussed, the California Court of Appeals stated music, in general, cannot be
construed as advocacy because it contains figurative expressions and is not meant to be taken
literally. McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 194 (1988). However, this essay argues
gangsta rap is meant to be taken literally, in order to effect awareness and change. Therefore
gangsta rap may be considered "advocacy" regardless of the McCollum dicta. Gangsta rap seeks
to expose the literal and often depressing truth about inner city life. Rappers use no poetic
devices because they intend to portray reality. See, e.g., Janine McAdams, Credibility and
Commerciality, BILLBOARD, Nov. 23, 1991, at RI (stating even though some rap artists paint
pictures of "a harsh and violent world their popularity is based in the basic realism of [the] street
life they present"). Ronald Howard, sentenced to death for the murder of Bill Davidson, stated:
Where I come from people hate the police... They harass you for nothing.. . just
because you're a young black male, like Tupac says. But I never really thought
about fighting back until I heard [N.W.A's] 'F--- Tha' Police.' It was like 'Yeah,
why should I just stand there and take that [expletive]?' To me, rap never glorified
violence. It just told the truth.
Chuck Philips, Rap Defense Doesn't Stop Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1993, at F4-5.
Many young listeners join in Howard's sentiments. See, e.g., Leland, supra note 5, at 63
(regarding the music of Snoop Doggy Dogg, one fan said, "[Snoop] tells it like it's supposed to
be told").
130. Obviously, not every song will fall into the category of "political speech." That
analysis will first require a showing that the song is protected speech; a point reiterated in the
caselaw. See supra notes I 1-13 and accompanying text. As long as the song does not fit into the
few specified exceptions to First Amendment protection, the analysis will continue. For a list of
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lyrics are clearly protected by the First Amendment and do not constitute
incitement, the burden then shifts to those who would make such lyrics
actionable.1
31
1. Is the Music Directed to Inciting Violent Acts?
Most rap songs do not contain explicit calls to action; rather, they serve
as descriptions of inner-city life. The Supreme Court's direct commands
prong requires a strong indication that the speaker intended the act
encouraged in the song to be carried out.' 32 However, most rappers would
argue their songs are not directed toward inciting any violence. To the
contrary, most of these artists would aver that peace and unification is their
ultimate goal.' 33 Of course, it may be difficult to reconcile this goal with the
fact that many of the rappers themselves have participated in the very violence
they claim to disavow. 1
34
Moreover, some rap music contains either explicit directives or language
of such specificity as to meet the incitement prong of the Brandenburg test.
For example, in a song by rapper Ice Cube, he commands his listeners to burn
down Korean-owned grocery stores in retaliation for the killing of Latisha
Harlins by a Korean store owner.135 The lyrics specify the target (Korean
grocery store owners), the method of violence (arson) and the specific motive
(avenging the death of a young black girl). Consequently, a court may find
this song meets the first requirement of the Brandenburg test because the level
exceptions, see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. Because restrictions on song lyrics
are inherently content-based, the compelling interest test will likely be applied. Unfortunately,
thorough coverage of the compelling interest test and its applicability to gangsta rap is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, it certainly may be applicable, and worthy of further exploration
and discussion.
131. See Redish, supra note 22, at 1182. ("[The Brandenburg test] engages in the
presumption that free speech should generally prevail over any attempts to silence it").
132. See discussion supra Part II.
133. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
134. Many rappers have histories that include the acts of violence and illegal conduct which
they rap about. For example, Tupac Shakur was charged with forcibly sodomizing and sexually
abusing a young woman and with allegedly shooting two off-duty police officers after a traffic
argument in Atlanta. Leland, supra note 5, at 62. In November 1994, Shakur was shot five times
during a robbery in the lobby of a Manhattan recording studio, and survived. Ginia Bellafante,
Thug Life Imitates Art, TIME, Dec. 12, 1994, at 101. But on September 7, 1996, Shakur was
gunned down and killed after attending a professional boxing match in Las Vegas. Patrick
Rogers, Prophecy Fulfilled: Rap Gangsta Tupac Shakur Died As His Lyrics Suggested He Might,
PEOPLE MAG., Sept. 30, 1996, at 79. Also, rapper Snoop Doggy Dogg was charged with murder
and released on one million dollars bail. Id. Rapper Dr. Dre, settled a lawsuit for assaulting
television hostess Dee Barnes. Id.
135. See Csathy, supra note 30.
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of specificity is so high as to indicate Ice Cube's intent that Korean-owned
grocery stores actually be set aflame.
Other rap songs specifically identify individuals that the lyricists believe
should be killed. In another Ice Cube song, the rapper directs his former
N.W.A. rapmates to kill their Jewish manager, Jerry Heller.136 A video for the
rap group Public Enemy depicts the suppositious assassination of former
Arizona Governor Evan Mecham, who vetoed that state's legislatively
recognized observance of the Martin Luther King holiday. 37  The court's
interpretation of these lyrics may ultimately determine such a case.
An argument can be made that while Ozzy Osbourne addresses, even
advocates, suicide as a positive alternative,'38 and while Hustler magazine
details a potentially fatal method of seeking physical pleasure, 139 gangsta rap
is actually "preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such
action. ' 14° On its Fear of a Black Planet141 album, Public Enemy calls upon
its listeners to "Fight the Power"'142 in order to achieve true racial equality, and
sings of a need for a "Revolutionary Generation"1 43 to make a stand and fight
for what they deserve. However, this sounds more like psychological
preparation or political agitation than a command to commit specific unlawful
acts.
Whether the language in gangsta rap lyrics meets the first prong of the
Brandenburg test hinges on determining whether the song contains specific
directives, or is a mere statement urging the targeted listeners to prepare
themselves for the bitter hardships of reality. Depending upon the facts of any
given case a court could decide either way. Assessing the language in the
136. See Csathy, supra note 30. Jerry Heller claims to have received death threats as a
result of the song, which are as follows:
Get rid of that devil, real simple
Put a bullet in his temple
Cause you can't be a nigger for life crew
With a white Jew tellin' you what to do.
Id.
137. Id.
138. McCullom, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 190-191. ("The lyrics sung by Osbourne may well
express a philosophical that suicide is an acceptable alternative to a life that has become
unendurable-an idea which new, however unorthodox, has a long intellectual tradition.").
139. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1018, 1022 (5th Cir. 1987).
140. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (quoting Noto v. United States, 367
U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
141. PUBLIC ENEMY, FEAR OF A BLACK PLANET (Def Jam Records 1990).
142. PUBLIC ENEMY, Fight the Power, on FEAR OF A BLACK PLANET (Def Jam Records
1990).
143. PUBLIC ENEMY, Revolutionary Generation, on FEAR OF A BLACK PLANET (Def Jam
Records 1990).
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Ronald Ray Howard case, 44 however, the true lack of any specific directives
would likely lead a court to find the first prong of Brandenburg could not be
met.
2. What is the Likelihood That the Music Will Incite Violence?
The actual occurrence of the harm advocated in a song can present
strong evidence that the song was likely to incite violence. 145 In the Ronald
Ray Howard case, a police officer was shot by a young man listening to a
song that promoted murdering a police officer to avoid being pulled over. 146
The court found the likelihood prong of the Brandenburg test was not met.
147
Defendants could present a substantial obstacle to satisfying this requirement
by proving intervening causes led to the incident. Such a finding relegates the
importance of the music to one of many factors rather than the primary
motivator.148 In the language of traditional tort theory, the lyrics would not be
the proximate cause of the death.
In the event that no harm has occurred, or if the court seeks additional
evidence the speech would likely result in harm, the plaintiff must show a
high degree of foreseeability of harm. 149  Plaintiffs may attempt to prove
foreseeability and deliberate intent to incite by showing the specific music in
question is targeted toward an audience whose members are vulnerable to
incitement. 150 These plaintiffs may also claim gangsta rap specifically targets
144. See supra Part I.
145. See supra Part III.B.2.
146. See supra Part I.
147. Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., No. Civ. A. V-94-006, 1997 WL 405907, at *20 (S.D.
Tex. Mar. 31, 1997). "While the Davidsons may have shown that Shakur intended to produce
imminent lawless conduct, the Davidson's cannot show that Howard's violent conduct was an
imminent and likely result of listening to Shakur's songs." Id. Further, the opinion stated
"although the court cannot recommend 2PACALYPSE NOW to anyone, it will not strip Shakur's
free speech rights based on the evidence presented by the Davidsons." Id. at 22.
148. It is important to reiterate that the likelihood requirement should ultimately measure
whether the music was likely to incite or produce imminent unlawful action, even before any such
incident occurred. The occurrence of harm is simply a factor in this determination, and not
conclusive to a finding of likelihood.
149. See Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 899-902, 928. See also text accompanying
notes 50-51.
150. See McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 190 ("Osbourne in his music sought to appeal to an
audience which included troubled adolescents and young adults who were having a difficult time
during this transition period of their life; plaintiffs allege that this specific target group was
extremely susceptible to the external influence and directions from a cult figure such as Osbourne
who had become a role model and leader for many of them."); see also Plaintiff's Complaint at
X, XI, Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., No. Civ. A. V-94-006 (D. Tex. Filed Dec. 1, 1993) (complaint
on file with Vanderbilt Law Review) ("The language and music on [Shakur's] tape was directed
specifically at young black males and particularly young black males confronted by police.
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black inner city youths and gang members who are especially susceptible to
outside suggestive influences.' 5 '
Supporters of regulations argue in light of the pre-existing proclivities of
this target market, certain gangsta rap songs are the impetus necessary to urge
these audience members into the violent behavior reflected in many of the
songs. 1 52 Moreover, those who take such a stance further contend rappers,
knowing their audience, are aware of the inciting effect of their music. 153
Therefore, they would argue any ensuing violence is foreseeable to the artist
and the producer. The fact that the rappers as role models to this target
audience, set poor examples with their own criminal records, strengthens this
argument. 
54
The foreseeability argument ultimately fails because the circumstances
surrounding the alleged target market are always at issue. 155 The societal
difficulties portrayed in rap songs are not caused by rap music. 15 6 Rather,
rappers reflect what they see in the world around them and many do so to
facilitate change and to improve those conditions, not to make them worse.
This situation is similar to the proverbial chicken-and-egg dilemma, to which
we must ask: which came first, the violent atmosphere or the music which
portrays that violent atmosphere? The former is most likely the correct
answer. Although it would be difficult to prove otherwise, many people argue
the opposite. Newsweek writer John Leland remarked that urban violence and
its attendant problems are "outside [rap] music, not within."' 57 Rappers and
their producers can nevertheless argue convincingly they only foresaw
positive changes as a result of their music. 158 Due to intervening causes and a
Young black males are instructed by the language and the music to take immediate, violent,
illegal action against police officers. The language and music was directed to and intended to
incite immediate lawless action on the part of those to whom the message was directed.").
151. But see Leland, supra note 5 at 64 (noting some reports, however, show white record
buyers represent "the largest segment of the rap audience" and alleging the demands of the white
rap audience are the driving force behind "the increasing prevalence of violent and misogynist
imagery").
152. Former Senator Carol Moseley-Braun (D-Ill) stated, "[w]e're talking about drive-by
shooting, murder and drug-related crimes that have reached a level of heinousness, and it is being
reflected or incited by this 'gangsta' rap music." ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 19, 1993, at
9.
153. See Plaintiff's Complaint at X, XI, Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., No. Civ. A. V-94-
006 (D. Tex. Filed Dec. 1, 1993) (complaint on file with Vanderbilt Law Review); supra Part V.B. 1.
154. See discussion supra note 134.
155. See Leland, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
156. See generally Leland, supra note 5.
157. See Leland, supra note 5, at 64.
158. Michael Saunders, Rising With a Bullet: Rap and Guns, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25,
1993, at 36.
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difficult burden of proof, plaintiffs may be hard-pressed to prove
foreseeability in many incitement claims. 59
C. Did the Music Incite Imminent Unlawful Behavior?
If a court interprets the imminence requirement in the classic
Brandenburg sense, then no claim that recorded music has incited violent
behavior can succeed. Such a strict interpretation would require temporal
imminence 160 and live rather than recorded speech.' 61 According to some
commentators, the Brandenburg test was specifically created to prevent harm
caused by live speech made in effort to arouse a crowd to commit criminal
acts.162 Almost every case involving music allegedly inciting violence has
involved recorded music as opposed to live performances. 63 Recorded songs
cannot produce temporal imminence because by the time the listener hears the
words, the speaker and the song lyrics are remote from one another.' 
64
Claims that gangsta rap incites third parties to perform violent acts fall
short of meeting courts' narrow interpretation of the imminence requirement.
The speaker's ability to control the listener is diminished by the fact that with
taped music, the listener retains all control over whether and when to hear the
music and how often to repeat the message. 65  A court employing this
traditional narrow definition would likely find it difficult to conclude that any
unlawful conduct that occurs following exposure to recorded music meets the
159. This Article does not discuss how much evidence of foreseeability, by way of studies
and the like, could enable a plaintiff to overcome this barrier. That is a finding for the court to
make in individual cases.
160. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
161. See generally Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
162. See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1023.
163. One exception is Matarazzo v. Aerosmith Productions, No. 86 Civ. 8815, 1989 WL
140322 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1989), involving a plaintiff who claimed to have been struck in the
nose by an unknown audience member while at an Aerosmith concert. Matarazzo's sued
Aerosmith and its producers for "attracting such 'crazies' to the concert by promoting and selling
records and tapes of the group's music." Id. at *1. Before trial, the Matarazzo's released Warner
Brothers from the case and Warner Brothers moved that Rule 11 sanctions be filed against the
plaintiffs. Id. The district court denied the motion, stating that because the caselaw regarding
attempts to hold producers liable for inciting lawlessness is so new and unsettled, it was not clear
that the plaintiffs had "absolutely no chance of success." Id. at *3.
164. There are numerous arguments on both sides of the "live/taped" debate. Proponents of
regulations argue taped speech is perhaps more dangerous than live speech for two reasons: 1) it
can reach far more people and 2) it is designed for repeated exposure, which, arguably, can work
a listener into a frenzy and spur them to action as well as a live performance. See Csathy, supra
note 30, at 3. Opponents point out a listener of recorded music has to take so many affirmative
steps (buying the album and playing it repeatedly) that the speaker is arguably removed from the
equation.
165. See Csathy, supra note 30, at 3.
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imminence requirement. Conversely, plaintiffs bringing a claim of incitement
due to exposure to live music would have a substantially stronger claim.
However, the plaintiff must still meet the requirements for the other prongs of
Brandenburg.
A court employing Professor Redish's broader interpretation of the
imminence requirement could find the requirement is met in some
circumstances. This flexible interpretation enables a court to balance the
various facts in a case with the interests involved, allaying the need for a
strong showing of imminence and placing particular weight on the interest of
protected First Amendment freedoms. 166  Even using this flexible method,
First Amendment protection must carry significant weight in the balance.
167
Only when armed with substantial compelling factors could a court conclude
speech constitutes unlawful incitement and should therefore be denied First
Amendment protection. 168 Because this flexible approach requires a case-by-
case analysis, no definitive determination can apprise whether gangsta rap
would survive under such a model. However, a case with enough significant
factors could exist and a court, using the flexible approach, might determine a
song constitutes unlawful incitement. This determination might lead a court
to impose liability.
VI. THE IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTION
The last section of this Article assumes that some court could hear a case
in which the song lyrics and circumstances in question meet the Brandenburg
test. 169  Major record labels have already begun to prepare for a wave of
claims alleging the music they produce has incited violent acts. 70  A few
courts may find the music at issue has incited unlawful conduct because,
166. See generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
167. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see also Redish, supra note
22, at 1182.
168. See generally Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444.
169. Csathy, supra note 30, at 5. Though seemingly remote, "highly-visible and
controversial violent messages sell. And that is enough to ensure that those kinds of 'inciting'
recorded messages will only multiply in number, thereby keeping both music stores and attorneys
busy for months and years to come." Id.
170. Record companies have created or upgraded their lyric review committees. They have
also pulled songs, even albums and groups, which may substantially increase their risk of liability
beyond the foreseeable profit gained from the album sales. See Griffin, supra note 123. In
September, 1995, Time Warner sold its 50% share in Interscope because of the controversy
surrounding gangsta rap. See Jeffrey Trachtenberg, Time Warner Sells Its Stake in Label
Criticized for Rap, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1995, at B9.
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except for a small handful of more or less similar cases, there is no conclusive
precedent to preclude such a finding.
17 1
A. Concerns Regarding the Imposition ofLiability
Individuals that oppose liability or other restrictions on music and
entertainment list several problems that may arise should a court find
particular lyrics constitute incitement and justify liability. First, there exists a
valid concern that such a finding would equal impermissible censorship and
lead to self-censorship of otherwise protected speech.7 2  When a court
determines that a song constitutes unlawful incitement and imposes damages
upon the artist and producers, that song will most likely be pulled from the
market in order to avoid further claims and capitalization of profits gained
from sales of the song. 173 Although not court-ordered, 74 such songs would
ultimately be censored. This kind of censorship is already occurring.
175
Record companies, in an attempt to preempt liability claims, already reject
songs and groups that may expose them to a high risk of litigation.
176
171. Stanford Law Professor Marc Franklin noted, in reference to caselaw regarding
entertainment claimed to incite violence, "[t]here's no Supreme Court precedent here, and each
state's got its own shot at this thing. If you try any lawsuit in a controversial area these days, with
people getting maimed or killed, you're going to find a couple of courts somewhere around the
country [that will hear it]." Terry Pristin & David Fox, Pop Culture. Violence. Copycats.
Blame?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1993, at F8.
172. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 22, at 1178 (contending advocacy of illegal conduct
should only be suppressed if it presents "a danger of true harm" so as to avoid self-censorship);
see also Seth Goodchild, Twisted Sister, Washington Wives, and the First Amendment: The
Movement to Clamp Down on Rock Music, 3 ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 131, 169 (1986) (asserting that
album rating and labeling systems would likely lead to self-censorship of artists and therefore
compromise their protected artistic freedoms).
173. Griffin, supra note 123, at R4. As Dave Funkelstein, director of Hollywood Basic
Records, stated, "[t]he bigwigs at major [record] labels tend to not want to stick their necks out.
The bottom line with them is making money." Id.
174. Although not fully covered in this essay, a court-ordered prohibition of a single song,
based on the court's finding that the song constitutes unlawful incitement, would likely be
constitutional. If a court properly finds the song unlawfully incites violent acts, the court
removes the song from the protective ambit of the First Amendment, and can censor it at will. On
the other hand, a general government prohibition of a certain type of song likely exceeds
constitutional boundaries, because a finding of incitement is very fact-specific and cannot broadly
sweep in an entire genre.
175. Culture, Violence and the Cult of the Unrepentant Rogue, BILLBOARD, Dec. 25, 1993,
at 5. Billboard editors encouraged the industry to self-censor the more degrading, offensive
works. The editors warned, "[e]ither we resolve individually as the record-selling and record-
buying public to turn away from the propagation of the hatefully self-destructive material
currently threatening to overshadow the more meaningful segments of the marketplace, or we will
reap the consequences of what we've sown." Id.
176. See Griffin, supra note 123 at C7 (where a number of labels refused to release certain
recordings).
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Moreover, knowledge of this potential liability can lead musicians to curb
their artistic instincts toward lyrics that are more controversial. Instead, artists
will favor lyrics that will be acceptable and promotable to record companies
and retail stores. 7 7 In order to retain artistic freedom, many rappers are
seeking lower budget, independent labels that still seek to empower the voice
of change presented by rappers, regardless of the risk.
These intra-industry restrictions on largely protected speech already
exist. A finding of unlawful incitement by a court would only compel the
industry and the artists to further their self-censoring practices. Nevertheless,
any government practice or policy which encourages or promotes self-
censorship of protected speech undermines the basic tenets of the First
Amendment. 1
78
The result of self-censorship is that open marketplace of ideas suffers
because a form of dissent vanishes from the marketplace. Musicians and
producers censoring the more controversial lyrics are likely to remove those
ideas from the market, stifling any opportunity for society to test those ideas
for truth or value. 179 As a result of self-censorship, the marketplace of ideas
will no longer be open and societal enrichment will suffer.'
80
Dissent has enabled revolutionaries to increase awareness of societal
problems and to effect change. 18' Gangsta rappers seek to enlighten their
listeners and the public to the harsh realities of ghetto life and urban violence
ultimately hoping to encourage unity and peace. 182 If-as a result of potential
liability-offensive and disagreeable ideas are censored before reaching the
marketplace, society loses a valuable voice of dissent. 183 Censoring gangsta
177. See Eric Boehlert, Meet the New Boss, ROLLING STONE, July 10, 1997, at 30. In 1996,
the retail chain WalMart began requiring artists to change both lyrics and album covers on
controversial material before the store would allow the albums to be sold. Bands such as
Butthole Surfers, 311, Foxy Brown and Beck have agreed to change the names of their songs and
album covers in order to get their records on the WalMart shelves. If such alterations occur, a
small sticker is attached to the album's bar code that reads "EDITED" that most purchasers are
not even aware exists. Id.
178. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) ("Under
some circumstances, indirect 'discouragements' undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon
the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes."); see also
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 309 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[I]nhibition
as well as prohibition against the exercise of precious First Amendment rights is a power denied
to government.").
179. See American Communications Ass 'n., 339 U.S. at 402-03.
180. Id.
181. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Free
speech has been on balance an ally of those seeking change .... Without a strong guarantee of
freedom of speech, there is no effective right to challenge [the status quo].")
182. See supra Parts V-V.A.
183. See American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 771 F.2d at 332.
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rap lyrics may be only the first step towards removing all speech which
questions the status quo. As a result, this censorship will preserve the status
quo and create a barrier to societal change.
A second major concern is that a court which makes a finding of
incitement may not be able to establish workable precedent. 8 4 Because of
current uncertainties regarding claims of incitement caused by
entertainment,185 a court opinion that does not establish a clear framework
for analysis and discernible standards for industry use will only lend to the
frustration. 86  In order to set forth clear standards for liability, a court
would need to detail fully how it applied which version of the Brandenburg
test, or some other test, and how it justified its decision in light of the
imminence requirement.1 87 Lack of clarity in any aspect of a court decision
that imposes liability for gangsta rap found to incite violent behavior will
only foster confusion and encourage further self-censorship.
B. A Proposed Solution. Guidelines for Analysis
The music industry needs a lucid set of guidelines for the legal analysis
of music claimed to incite violent behavior for three primary reasons. First,
Brandenburg-strictly construed-does not serve its alleged purpose in
gangsta rap cases. The test exists in order to shield political expression from
challenge and to exempt inherently dangerous speech from First Amendment
protection.188  Therefore, some gangsta rap music may be deemed
unprotected. Regardless, because of Brandenburg's imminence requirement,
no recorded music could constitute unprotected incitement. 8 9 However, such
a result does not comport with the values upon which the original test was
founded. 190 Courts should adopt a variation of the clear and present danger
and Brandenburg tests to reflect the uncompromised importance of political
expression while acknowledging that some recorded music falls outside the
constitutional boundaries of protection.
184. See Zamora v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199, 202 (S.D. Fla. 1979). In
rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that generalized violent television programming incited their son to
shoot a neighbor, the court stated that a "recognition of the 'cause' claimed by the plaintiffs
would provide no recognizable standard for the television industry to follow." Id.
185. See supra Part IV.
186. See Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 202.
187. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
188. See supra Parts II-III.A.
189. See supra Part III.B. 1.
190. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
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Second, consistently recognized and applied guidelines will create
cultivated, intelligible precedent for future judicial application. 19' Third, such
guidelines will provide a constitutional framework within which artists and
producers can make decisions. Artists and producers will have some ability to
predict exactly which lyrics could expose them to liability and which will not,
thereby substantially preventing overbroad self-censorship.
1. The Proposed Guidelines
In order to hold artists and producers liable for harms resulting from
dangerous song lyrics, the lyrics should be required to constitute unlawful
incitement, and to meet all of the following requirements:
1) Language: The lyrics must include explicit language including a
direct call to action, 92 and advocacy of a particular type of unlawful conduct
targeted toward a specific person or group of persons.
2) Real Threat of Harm: A real threat of harm must be a likely
consequence of the song and must be evidenced by an actual occurrence of
harm similar to that advocated in the song, or by threatened or attempted harm
similar to that advocated in the song. If a threatened or attempted act occurs,
it must have had a substantial probability of success. The party seeking a
finding of incitement must prove this threat of harm by clear and convincing
evidence. 1
93
3) Balance of Interests: Any redeeming social value of the song lyrics,
combined with the weight of presumed First Amendment protection of the
lyrics, will be weighed against the state's interest in preventing the harm
claimed. This balancing necessarily begins with the presumption that the
lyrics should be protected against a finding of incitement.' 
94
4) Proof Requirement: The party seeking to prove incitement must
establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that a causal link existed between
the song lyrics and the attempted or threatened harm. Such a link could be
191. Specific analytical frameworks such as that offered in this Article may also become the
basis for proposed legislation. However, such legislation should be avoided because the
Brandenburg test and the guidelines proposed herein are so fact-driven in application that any
sweeping legislation would prove inappropriate and likely unconstitutional.
192. Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 204.
193. Although this requirement seems to fall into the paradigm of claims that focus more on
the consequence of the speech than on the speech itself, it actually accomplishes two goals. First,
it reconfirms the generally recognized standing requirement that actual harm be shown. This
prevents groups, such as concerned parents or citizens from bringing unfounded cases against
relatively harmless songs based solely on their offensive content. Second, it helps establish the
likelihood requirement, in conjunction with the proof requirements set forth in the guidelines, and
it helps ensure a case will be decided based on the individual facts of the case presented.
194. See supra notes 74-77.
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proven by establishing the harm would not have occurred but for the impetus
provided in the song and intervening causes did not supersede the song lyrics
as the primary motivator of the actor.
5) Gravity of Harm: Only those songs which advocate serious harm to
nonculpable third parties will be subjected to this test.
These guidelines are to be construed strictly based on the plain language
of the requirements. This test is deliberately narrow to preserve the integrity
of the First Amendment.
2. Analysis of the Proposed Guidelines
The above guidelines enable an analysis similar to the flexible
interpretation of the Brandenburg test, in that it allows for a lesser showing of
imminence. 195 However, this leniency is offset by requiring the plaintiff to
prove all other factors by clear and convincing evidence, subject to strict
judicial scrutiny. Thus, a court can use these guidelines to find incitement
when the evidence points to a determination that the song lyrics lie outside
First Amendment protection even though the Brandenburg-defined
imminence' 96 does not clearly exist.'
97
These guidelines distinguish a minute group of rap songs that may prove
exempt from First Amendment protections based on the facts of a specific
case. This type of test benefits all parties concerned. First, for proponents of
restrictions, it establishes an actual, applicable test that defines what kinds of
songs are exposed to liability claims. The test recognizes some songs, though
very few, may be worthy of a finding of incitement, rather than making the
sweeping assertion that every song is protected, regardless of the
circumstances.
Second, for artists and producers, the guidelines clearly described will
not be protected by courts under the First Amendment.198 Self-censorship
will be reduced to a bare minimum if these rules are applied.
Finally, because the guidelines only restrict language presenting more of
a threat and a danger than a social good and because they encourage a
195. See supra Part III.B.3.
196. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
197. This article may be criticized for compromising artistic integrity by presenting a test
that is less than absolutely protective of speech by eliminating the need to prove imminence.
However, this test represents a pragmatic approach for courts presented with a case in which
incitement is most likely present. This test is a viable alternative for Brandenburg and is equally
speech-protective, because the causal link proof requirement essentially replaces the imminence
requirement and is as difficult to prove as the imminence requirement.
198. Aggravating factors are outlined in guidelines 2-5. See supra Part VI.B. 1.
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substantial decline in self-censorship, they preserve and perhaps even foster
the open marketplace of ideas.
VII. CONCLUSION
Political expression generally merits absolute First Amendment
protection, absent a showing of the intent and likelihood of imminent
lawless action. 99 Traditionally, music-whether clearly political or not-
does not constitute the kind of speech which incites violent acts. This is
either because it does not contain the kind of direct command required by
Brandenburg, or because any reaction to the music could not be considered
imminent in the classic sense.200 However, the legal tides are turning. The
current fashion of blaming music like gangsta rap for violent behavior has
legal scholars, courts and plaintiffs reconsidering the applicability of the
Brandenburg test.20' In order to preserve the integrity of the First
Amendment and the open marketplace of ideas upon which the freedom of
speech is founded, no erosion of Brandenburg can be tolerated.
199. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
200. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
201. See discussion supra Part III.B. 1.
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